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MARQUETTE
LAW REVIEW

VOLUME XXVIII

SUMMER, 1944

NUMBER TWO

REVOCATION OF CITIZENSHIP"DENATURALIZATION"
WALTER STEIN.*

V

ERY few legal proceedings have been subjected to such thorough
scrutiny as has the judicial revocation or cancellation of naturalization. Decisions were fairly numerous and the subject was thought
fairly uncontroversial prior to the Schneiderman' case. The Supreme
Court, though rendering a fairly sweeping decision on the subject, left
several essential points unresolved which have resulted in subsequent
conflicting decisions, even in appellate courts. 2 This paper is intended
to give an up-to-date but rather general review on the subject in the
light of rendered decisions, though it is recognized that-judicially at
least-the last word has not yet been spoken. Although the writer has
*B.S. of Economics, University of Pennsylvania; LL.B., University of Pennsylvania; Member of Pennsylvania and Federal Bars; former Assistant Deputy
Attorney General, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; in charge of denaturalization unit, Immigration & Naturalization Service, United States Department of

Justice.

United States v. Schneiderman, 320 U. S. 118, 63 Sup. Ct. 1333, 87 L.Ed.
1796 (1943).

2United States v. Krause, 136 F (2d) 935 (C.C.A. 7th 1943). Contra United
States v. Meyer, 141 F. (2d) 825 (C.C.A. 5th 1944).
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been engaged in denaturalization work for the Immigration and
Naturalization Service since November 1942, views expressed in this
article are purely his personal views.
Revocation or cancellation of naturalization is a judicial proceeding
instituted for the purpose of revoking the order admitting a person
to citizenship and cancelling the certificate of naturalization on the
ground that naturalization was fraudulently or illegally procured. The
proceedings culminate in a judicial finding that naturalization was obtained by fraud or illegality, that it would never have been granted
had that fraud been known, and therefore the naturalization was void
from the beginning.3
All revocations are now statutory, 4 but revocation proceedings were
sustained even prior to the first statute which went into effect in
1906.' The constitutionality of the revocation statute has been raised
and its constitutionality upheld by the Supreme Court of the United
States."
The words "cancellation," "revocation" and "denaturalization" have
been used to describe the proceedings. The early statute used the word
"cancellation"; the Nationality Act of 1940, in effect since January 13,
1941, speaks of "revocation"; and "denaturalization" has been used
in recent fraud cases, where the grounds are lack of attachment to
the principles of the Constitution and lack of allegiance to the United
States.7
Revocation proceedings can naturally only be instituted against the
very person who procured the naturalization, since fraud or illegality
in the procurement and at the time of the procurement must be proven.
A person who derived citizenship through a parent or spouse, could not
have practiced fraud or illegality, since he was not a party to the procedure. Nevertheless, his citizenship status may be affected by revocation proceedings against the person through whom he derived citizenship. 8
Revocation proceedings may now be instituted only by United
States District Attorneys. Actions may not be brought by private indi3Rosenberg v. United States, 60 F. (2d) 475 (C.C.A. 3rd 1932). Cert. denied 287
U.S. 645, 53 Sup. Ct. 91, 77 L.Ed. 558 (1932). Johanessen v. United States, 225
U.S. 227, 32 Sup. Ct. 613, 56 L.Ed. 1066 (1911).

4 Sec.

338 of the Nationality Act of 1940 (8 U.S.C.A. 738) which replaces Section 15 of the Act of June 29, 1906 (34 Stat. 601).
5 Banks v. Walker, 3 Barbour c. 438 (N.Y. 1848) ; United States v. Kornwehl
89 Fed. 10 (D.C. New Jersey 1898). Contra United States v. Gleason, 90 Fed.
778 (C.C.A. 2d, 1898) ; Behrensmeyer v. Kreitz, 135 Ill. 591, 26 N.E. 704 (1891).
6 Johanessen v. United States 225 U. S. 227, 32 Sup. Ct. 613, 56 L.Ed. 1066 (1911)
and Luria v. United States 231 U. S. 9, 34 Sup, Ct. 10, 58 L.Ed. 101 (1913) are
the two leading cases on the subject.
7 See infra.
8 Infra derivative cases, footnote 73.
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viduals,9 nor by State's Attorneys, 10 nor by naturalization officers.11
The early statute was amended in 1918,12 allowing institution of actions
by the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner of Naturalization.
However, the Nationality Act of 1940, in effect since January 13, 1941,
returns to the original language of the 1906 Statute, limiting such
authority to United States District Attorneys.
Since revocation proceedings are in equity, the courts have wide
latitude allowing intervention. Persons who derived citizenship through
the defendant and whose citizenship may be affected are usually
allowed to intervene, but such intervention must be timely.' 3 However, intervention has been allowed, even where the applicant would
4
not be affected, though he derived citizenship through the defendant.
All revocation proceedings are now under the Nationality Act of
1940, since the statute provides for its applicability not only to certificates issued thereunder, but also to any certificate issued under any
prior law. 15 The Supreme Court has held that the retroactive feature
of the statute is not unconstitutional. 1 6 Though this question arose under
the 1906 Act, it is still authority for the present law, since the retroactive feature of the early Act was reenacted by the Nationality Act
of 1940.
Jurisdiction in revocation actions is conferred by statute upon all
courts which have authority to naturalize persons as citizens of the
United States.'1 The suit must be brought in the jurisdiction where
the naturalized person last resided, regardless of where the naturalization took place.'" Where the defendant resides abroad, suit should be
instituted in the district of his last known residence in this country, 9
and if he is incarcerated, in the district of his last voluntary residence.20
A suit to revoke an order of admission and cancelling the certificate of naturalization, regardless of the consequences, is a civil and
not a criminal action. 2 Moreover, it is in the nature of special pro9 Pintsch Compressing.Co. v. Bergin, 84 Fed. 140 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1897).
10 Petersen v. State, 40 Tex. Civ. App. 175, 89 S.W. 81 (1905).
"1 United States v. Anderson, 169 Fed. 201 (C.D. Idaho ,1909).
12 Act of May 9, 1918, 40 Stat. 544, 8 U.S.C.A. 405.
"3 United States v. Rosenberg, 60 Fed. (2d.) 475 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1932). Cert.denied,
287 U.S. 645, 53 Sup. Ct. 91, 17 L.Ed. 558 (1932).
14 United States v. Pane (D.C. New Jersey, July 17, 1943).
'5 Sec. 338(g) of the Nationality Act of 1940; 8 U.S.C.A. 738(g).
'4 Johanessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 32 Sup. Ct. 613, 56 L.Ed. 1066 (1911).
17 Sec. 338a of the Nationality Act of 1940; 8 U.S.C.A. 738(a).
' United States v. Luria, 231 U.S. 9, 34 Sup. Ct. 10, 58 L.Ed. 101 (1913) ; United
States v. Mansour, 170 Fed. 671 (D.C. N.Y. 1908) ; United States v. Aakervik,
180 Fed. 137 (D.C. Ore., 1940).
19 United States v. Knight, 291 Fed. 129 (D.C. Mont., 1923) affirmed 299 Fed.
571 (C.C.A. 9th 1924).
20 United States v. Gronich, 211 Fed. 548 (D.C. Wash., 1914).
21Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 34 Sup. Ct. 10, 58 L.Ed. 101 (1913).
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ceedings.2 2 Revocation proceedings are in equity and the rules of equity
jurisprudence and procedure are applicable and the defendant is not
entitled to a jury trial.23 The procedure is now entirely governed by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
2
Revocation proceedings are in rem and not in personam. ' The status
of the naturalized person and not the individual is the subject matter
of the action. Hence, a citizen abroad is subject to jurisdiction in this
country to litigate his status and personal service is not necessary.
25
There is due process where the subpoena is served by publication.
Revocation, in order to become effective, requires a judicial proceeding and an order or court decree2 6 However, where a naturalized
citizen has been convicted of knowingly procuring naturalization in
violation of the law, jurisdiction is conferred upon the court having
jurisdiction of such offense to enter an order cancelling the certifithe defendcate of naturalization and revoking the order admitting
27
ant to citizenship without a separate judicial proceeding.
The revocation procedure is a direct, and not a collateral attack on
the judgment granting naturalization.28 It is a special, separate and distinct remedy provided by Congress. Because of this, it has certain
features which distinguishes it from naturalization procedures or from
criminal proceedings resulting from naturalization frauds; and cer29
tain defenses, such as time limitations, viz., the statute of limitation,
32
21
0
or double
the doctrine of res judicata
laches, , estoppel,
jeopardy3 3 are not available.
The doctrine of res judicata does not apply to a decree of naturalization since Congress has provided for a special remedy for the cancellation of naturalization. The decree of naturalization is not res judicata
where the naturalization is granted ex parte.3 4 Even where the United
22 United States v. Mansour, 170 Fed. 676 (D.C. N.Y., 1909); United States v.

Sharrock, 276 Fed. 30 (D.C. Mont., 1921).
U.S. 9, 34 Sup. Ct. 10, 58 L.Ed. 101 (1913).
24 United States v. Knight, 291 Fed. 129 (D.C. Mont., 1923) ; aff'd 299 Fed. 571
(C.C.A. 9th, 1924).
25 Sec. 338(b) of the Nationality Act. of 1940; 8 U.S.C.A. 738(b).
28 Sec. 338(f) of the Nationality Act of 1940; 8 U.S.C.A. 738(f).
2 Sec. 338(e) of the Nationality Act of 1940; 8 U.S.C.A. 738(e).
28 Grahl v. United States, 261 Fed. 487 (C.C.A. Wis., 1919).
29United States v. Brass, 37 F. Supp. 698 (D.C. N.Y. 1941); United States v.
23 Luria v. United States, 231

Ali, 7 F. (2d) 728 (D.C. Mich., 1925); United States v. Parisi, 24 F. Supp. 414

(D.C. Md., 1938).
States v. Schneiderman. 320 U.S. 118, 63 Sup. Ct. 1333, 87 L.Ed. 1796
(1943); United States v. Brass, 37 F. Supp. 698 (D.C. N.Y. 1941); United
States v. Marino, 27 F. Supp. 155 (D.C. N.Y., 1939).
31 United States v. Owens, 133 F. (2d) 376 (C.C.A. 4th 1926) ; United States v.
Javier, 22 F. (2d) 879 (App. D.C., 1927) ; United States v. Marino, 27 F. Supp.
155 (D.C. N.Y., 1939).
3 See infra fn 34 and ff.
30United

33 See infra fn 42 and 43.
34

Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 32 Sup. Ct. 613, 56 L.Ed. 1066
(1911).
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States appears in the naturalization proceedings, it is not bound by the
decree of naturalization and can institute revocation proceedings. 5 Language in the Ness case,386 however, indicates that on minor questions
such as weight of evidence, credibility of witnesses or mere irregularity
in procedure, a decision of a court of naturalization, though clearly erroneous, is conclusive as against the United States, if it entered an
appearance.
There is conflict among the lower federal courts as to what matters
constitute findings of fact which cannot be reviewed in a cancellation
suit, and what matters are jurisdictional requisites as to which a decree of naturalization cannot be res judicata. Some of the lower courts
have gone far beyond the language of the Ness case3 7 and have violated
the principle of the Ginsberg case 38 which holds that a naturalization
court cannot supply prescribed qualifications that have no existence
in fact, such as racial eligibility, good moral character, and five years'
continuous residence in the United States immediately proceeding
naturalization, all of which are express substantive requirements of the
naturalization law. To the same effect as the Ginsberg case appears
the recent Baumgartner case.3 9
In the Schneiderman case 40 the Supreme Court uses language
describing the findings of the naturalization court as a judgment, which
gives rise to the question whether it is a judgment which stands in full
force and effect. The answer to this question would appear to be in
the negative. Aside from the fact that Congress by Statute provides
for a direct attack thereon and aside from the fact that there is an inherent power in Courts to set aside a judgment fraudulently or illegally
obtained, a naturalization judgment differs materially from any other
judgment. Unlike the common run of judgments, it does not vindicate
an existing right. It is a judgment granting a right which did not exist
prior to its pronouncement and which the court had no right to grant
except upon full and complete compliance by an alien with every condition imposed by the act authorizing the grant. The principles of res
judicata would therefore seem not to apply, as against the statutory
provisions for review and revocation of the judgment of naturaliza41
tion.
35

United States v. Ness, 245 U.S. 319, 38 Sup. Ct. 118, 62 L.Ed. 321 (1917);
United States v. Ginsburg. 243 U.S. 472, 37 Sup. St. 422, 61 LEd. 853 (1917).

36United States v. Ness, 245 U.S. 319, 38 Sup. Ct. 118, 62 L.Ed. 321 (1917).

3 United States v. Ness, 245 U.S. 319, 38 Sup. Ct. 115, 62 L.Ed. 321 (1917).

38 United States v. Ginsburg, 243 U.S. 472, 37 Sup. Ct. 422, 61 L.Ed. 853 (1917).
99Carl Wilhelm Baumgartner v. United States. (U. S. Supreme Court, June 12,

1944).
40 United States v. Schneiderman, 320 U.S. 118, 63 Sup. Ct. 1333, 87 L.Ed. 1796
41

(1943).

United States v. Maney, 278 U.S. 17, 49 Sup. Ct. 15, 73 L.Ed. 156 (1928);
United States v. Baumgartner, 47 Fed. Supp. 622 (D.C. Mo., 1942) affirmed 138
Fed. 2d 29 (C.C.A. 8th 1943), cert. allowed to Supreme Court, reversed June

12, 1944.
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An acquittal in a criminal prosecution for fraudulent procurement of a naturalization certificate under Section 338 and 346 of the
Nationality Act of 19404

constitutes neither res judicata, estoppel,

nor double jeopardy to bar the government from instituting proceed43
ings to cancel such naturalization.
Under the current statutory naturalization proceedings the United
States may appear for the purpose of cross-examining the petitioner
and his witnesses, producing its own witnesses and evidence and be
heard in opposition to granting of any petition in naturalization proceedings. However, there is no specific provision for an appeal. In
spite of earlier contradictory decisions it is now well settled that an
appeal will lie.44 The remedy afforded by the statutory provision looking toward revocation is an alternative and cumulative means of protection against illegal and fraudulent naturalization, 45 and may be resorted to, whether or not the original naturalization decree was appealed.
The order of naturalization can be revoked for fraud or illegality
which obtained in the procurement of that naturalization. Such fraud
or illegality must have existed either at the time of naturalization or
during the probationary period and must pertain to a material fact.
Theoretically, "material facts" are all naturalization requirements and
qualifications which must be complied with under the law.
The scope of this article makes an extended discussion of naturalization requirements and qualifications impractical. Therefore they are
46
listed here briefly and without citations.
An alien must have been admitted lawfully for permanent residence to be eligible for naturalization. An exception is the soldiers'
naturalization, where only lawful admission is required, although not
for permanent residence. Legislation is now pending which would make
members of the armed forces eligible for naturalization, almost regardless of their manner of entry. In all instances, except soldiers'
naturalizations, the law requires certain residence requirements which
the alien must have fulfilled. Furthermore, he must intend to reside
permanently in the United States. Desertion of the armed forces in
time of war, on leaving the United States with the intent to avoid a
lawfully ordered draft renders an alien ineligible to naturalization,
as does a claim for relief from military service as a neutral alien.
The law provides that no person shall be naturalized who cannot
speak the English language, except for persons physically unable to
U.S.C.A. 738 (e) & 746.
43 Sourino v. United States, 86 F. (2d) 309 (C.C.A. 5th 1936) cert. denied 300
428

U.S. 661, 57 Sup. Ct. 492, 81 L.Ed. 869 (1937).
,4 Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568, 46 Sup. Ct. 425, 70 L.Ed. 738 (1926).
45 United States v. Ness, 245 U.S. 319, 38 Sup. Ct. 115, 62 L.Ed. 321 (1917).
46 All naturalization qualifications may be found in the Nationality Act of 1940.
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do so. Itshould be noted, however, that courts have denied naturalization to illiterates in certain cases, on the ground that they could not
understand the principles of the Constitution. The law further requires certain racial eligibility, and imposes certain restrictions on
naturalization of enemy aliens in time of war.
An applicant for citizenship must have behaved as a person of good
moral character during the required residence period. The applicant
must believe in organized government and be attached to the principles of the Constitution and it is required that he swear allegiance to
the United States, and that he declare his willingness to support and
defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies foreign
and domestic, which includes a willingness to bear arms.
In addition all procedural requirements of the naturalization laws,
as found in the Act of June 29, 1906 (34 Stat. 596), as amended by the
Act of March 2, 1929 (45 Stat. 1513), and as recodified in the Nationality Act of 1940, must be strictly complied with.
Since strict compliance with the statute is mandatory, any failure
to do so could result in revocation proceedings. Since the first revocation statute in 1906, the law has always used the words "upon affidavit
showing good cause" as a prerequisite to the institution of revocation
proceedings. Although "good cause," technically speaking, is any procedural or jurisdictional failure, the Government has consistently
taken the position that "good cause" exists only in cases where revocation will result in the betterment of the citizenry.
Recent decisions 47 have laid particular stress on the preciousness
of citizenship. Language in the Meyer case 48 would seem to indicate
that cancellation proceedings are lightly instituted by the Government.
A more dispassionate concurring opinion in that case by Judge Holmes,
deciding the case purely on the question of evidence, should dissipate
that view. The burden of proof on the Government in revocation cases
is extremely great. It must prove its case by evidence which is "clear,
convincing and unequivocal and which does not leave the issue in
doubt. '49 Under the circumstances, therefore, when a case is reviewed
for the purpose of determining whether the Government will prevail,
only cases where there is considerable evidence could be considered.
The institution of capricious suits is altogether eliminated, unless of
course, the Government should be wholly unmindful of the existing
law.
47

United States v. Schneiderman, 320 U.S. 118, 63 Sup. Ct. 1333, 87 L.Ed. 1796

(1943) ; United States v. Meyer, 141 F. (2d) 825 (C.C.A. 5th 1944) and many
others.
48 Supra fn 45.
49 United States v. Schneiderman, 320 U.S. 118, 63 Sup. Ct. 1333, 87 L.Ed. 1796
(1943) which adopts and records a requirement long previous in existence.
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But even without the compulsion which the law imposes and by
which the institution of a revocation proceeding is circumscribed, the
Government has not changed its policy concerning the institution of
suits and it has ever been mindful of the high privilege which is represented by citizenship, and the grave consequences which result to the
person who is deprived of his citizenship.
While due safeguards should be provided for the naturalized citizen,
and while due regard should be had for such a high privilege, by the
same token the Government should not be rendered impotent to protect itself against imposition and barriers should not be erected making
it possible for aliens to acquire citizenship when they full well know
they are not entitled to it, and then making remedial procedures against
them impossible.
An excellent discussion on the subject of existing naturalization
procedure may be found in Judge Fee's opinion in the case of United
5°
States v. John Hans Scheurer.
True enough, the requirements of an
alien are inquired into before he is advised to file a petition for
naturalization and he and his two witnesses are heard both by a preliminary examiner, who goes over the case prior to the filing and a
designated examiner, who acts somewhat in the capacity of an advisory
master to the court. However, both these hearings are extremely perfunctory and do not lend themselves to ferret out the bad from the
good in all instances, though many aliens have been advised not to file,
and many petitions have been denied on the basis of evidence there
discovered.
Naturalizations run into six figures annually.5 1 The number of
naturalization examiners, who acted both as preliminary and designated
examiners, never exceeded 600 for the entire United States, Hawaii
and Puerto Rico. More often, the number was considerably less. It
takes no great mathematician to figure out how hard pressed for time
naturalization examiners were and how little time could be given to
each case. On the one hand there is an understandable and proper
public clamor for greater promptness in naturalizations and on the
other hand there is the limited resources of personnel, which Congress
has annually held to a minimum.
The figures relating to budgetary requirements and the ability of
Congress to meet them are not available. Congress, too, has a budget
and there is a limit to what it can do. It all adds up, however, to the
final fact, that naturalization can often be easily obtained and that
F. Supp.-(D.C. Ore., March 20, 1944).
51 Total number naturalized in the last 4 years: 1940-235,260; 1941-227,294;
1942-270,364; 1943-317,508.
5054
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it is not impossible for a cunning alien to conceal facts, which if
known, would have prevented his naturalization.
Before discussing the quantum and quality of evidence required,
the grounds for revocation, viz., fraud and illegality will be treated.
The word fraud as used in the statutes includes a wilful misrepresentation of virtually any fact which governs and determines whether
naturalization is to be granted and as a result -of which naturalization
has been accomplished. Two main categories have been recognized in
that respect:
(1) Mental reservation and
(2) Other misrepresentations and concealments.
The differentiation between the two categories is wholly arbitrary
and made for convenience only. Both are misrepresentations. The distinction is found in the fact that the first category concerns itself
with subjective facts, such as fraudulent intent, state of mind or mental
attitude, incapable of direct extraneous proof. It relates to allegations
in the petition for naturalization or in the oath of allegiance, such as
forswearing allegiance to one's former sovereign, accepting allegiance
to the United States, the profession of attachment to the principles
of the Constitution, the intention to reside permanently in the United
States or the willingness to bear arms.
The second category concerns itself with misrepresentations and
concealments of objective facts, subject to proof by direct and extraneous evidence, facts such as manner of entry into the United States,
marital status, commission of crimes, etc. These cases bear a much
closer resemblance to usual cases involving fraud.
The Nationality Act of 194052 uses the term "presumptive fraud"
which is held to refer principally to cases of persons who take up
residence abroad within five years after naturalization, 53 since there
arises a presumption that they did not intend to reside permanently
in the United States at the time of naturalization. "Presumptive fraud,"
however, is a misnomer. There is no such thing as a presumptive fraud.
Either there is fraud or there is not. The presumption goes to the
evidence, not the fraud. The use of the term is unfortunate, since it
has led to a great deal of confusion. All the statute provides for is a
rule of evidence that under given circumstances certain facts shall be
sufficient to establish fraud, unless countervailing evidence is produced.5"
A mental reservation in the renunciation of' allegiance to the petitioner's former country is fraud which will support revocation pro52 Sec. 319(b) 8 U.S.C.A. 719(b).
53
Sec. 338(c) of the Nationality Act of 1940, 8 U.S.C.A. 738(c).
54
Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 34 Sup. Ct. 10, 58 L.Ed. 101 (1913).
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ceedings, as is the mental reservation in the profession of allegiance
to the United States.55
Mental reservation of allegiance has been held to exist where the
subject sided with his country of origin rather than the United States,
when the two were at war,56 or where he worked against the United
States and in the interest of his country of origin where the two interests sharply diverged, though they were not at war,57 or where the
subject indicated his preference for his country of origin, particularly
where the latter's form of government was inconsistent with constitutional government as prevalent in the United States ;,5 or where the
subject was unwilling to take up arms for the United States against
his country of origin.5"
It has likewise been held that one who subscribed to the principles
of national socialism at the time of naturalization could not take an
oath of allegiance without mental reservations since national socialism
demands primary allegiance to the German Reich.60 .
A mental reservation in professed attachment to the principles of
the Constitution is fraud within the meaning of the revocation
61

statute.

The decided cases allow no definite conclusion on the question as
to how complete the attachment to the United States Constitution must
be since it expressly provides for its own amendment and also guarantees freedom of speech and freedom of the press. Criticism of the
United States Government and Constitution, and the advocacy of
changes therein by constitutional means do not in themselves constitute
a lack of attachment to the Constitution.62 On the other hand, advocacy
of the forcible overthrow of constitutional government, or the commission of offenses against existing provisions of the constitution or
5 Schurman v. United States, 264 Fed.'917 (C.C.A. 9th, 1920) ;United States v.
Kramer, 262 Fed. 395 (C.C.A. 5th, 1919) ; United States v. Krause, 136 F(2d)
935 (C.C.A. 7th, 1943).
5r United States v. Wursterbarth, 249 Fed. 908 (D.C. N.J. 1918) ; United States
v. Kramer, 262 Fed. 395 (C.C.A. 5th, 1919); Schurman v. United States, 264
Fed. 917 (C.C.A. 9th, 1920).
5 United States v. Ebel, 44 F. Supp. 43 (W.D. Tex., 1942); United States v.
Fischer, 48 Supp. 7 (S.D. Fla., 1942) ; United States v. Kuhn et al, 49 F. Supp.
58 407 (D.C. N.Y., 1943) now appealed to C.C.A. 2d.
United States v. Krause, 136 F. (2d) 935 (C.C.A. 7th, 1943).
59 United States v. Mickley, 44 F. Supp. 735 (E.D. Mich., 1942).
60United States v. A. H. Wolter, 53 F. Supp. 400 (W.D. Pa., 1943) appealed to
C.C.A. 3rd.
61 Glaser v. United States, 289 Fed. 255 (C.C.A. 7th. 1923); Rowan v. United
States, 18 F. (2d) 246 (C.C.A. 9th, 1927) ; United States v. Tapolscanyi, 40 F.
(2d) 255 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1930) ; Schneiderman v. United States, 119 F. (2d) 500
(C.C.A. 9th, 1941) reversed in Supreme Court on other grounds, 320 U.S. 118,
62 63 Sup. Ct. 1333, 87 L.Ed. 1796 (1943).
Rovin v. United States, 12 F. (2d) 942 (E.D. Mich., 1926).
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against laws enacted pursuant to such provisions are clear indications
of a lack of attachment to the principles of the Constitution.63
The measure of attachment required for naturalization should be,
but is not the guide for revocation proceedings. The proof as to lack
of attachment must be far greater in revocation proceedings, and evidence on which a petition may reasonably be denied at the time of the
final hearing on the petition is usually not sufficient to sustain a cancellation suit, though in theory it should be.
Lack of attachment to the principles of the Constitution has been
held to exist where the subject was a Communist and where he had
stated that he believed in the overthrow of the Capitalist class and
that he was opposed to organized government,64 and where the subject
subscribed to a governmental philosophy such as national socialism
which is the antithesis of the democratic form of Government as it
exists in the United States.'s
On the other hand, mere membership in the Communist Party
is not in itself sufficient unless it can be shown that the subject at the
time of naturalization subscribed to such of its principles as are inconsistent with attachment to the principles of the Constitution.6" Likewise,
mere membership in a national socialistic organization, such as the
German American Bund, is not sufficient indication of the subject's
lack of attachment to the principles of the Constitution, unless it can be
shown that he knew of and subscribed to the national socialistic prin61
ciples of that organization.
Petitioner's mental reservation as to his intention to reside permanently in the United States is fraud which will warrant revocation
proceedings.6 8 However there need to be no unalterable determination
to stay a lifetime in any particular place or country of residence, regardless of considerations of economic self-preservation. 6 Foreign
residence within five years after naturalization raises a rebuttable
presumption that the petitioner at the time of naturalization did not in
good faith intend to reside permanently in this country.70 Likewise a
63 United States v. Tapolscanyi, 40 F. (2d) 255 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1930); Turlei v.

United States, 31 F. (2d) 696 (C.C.A. 9th, 1929).

64 United States v. Tapolscanyi, 40 F. (2d) 255 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1930).; United States

v. Swelgin, 254 Fed. 884 (D.C. Ore., 1918).
65 United States v. Bergmann, 47 F. Supp. 765 (D.C. S., Cal., 1942) ; United States
v. Schuchhardt, 47 F. Supp. 567 (D.C. N. Ind., 1943) ; United States v. Ebell,

44 F. Supp. 43 (D.C. W. Tex., 1942).
66 United States v. Schneiderman, 320 U.S. 118, 63 Sup. Ct. 1333, 87 L.Ed. 1796

(1943).
61 United States v. Kuhn et al, 49 F. Supp. 407 (D.C. N.Y., 1943); United States
v. Hartmann, 50 F. Supp. 394 (D.C. E. Pa., 1943).

6s United States v. Ellis, 185 Fed. 546 (C.C. E.D., Louisiana, 1911); United States
v. Martin, 101F. (2d) 585 (D.C. Wis., 1925).
69United States v. Teresa & Robert Kuhn, 50 F. Supp. 400 (D.C. E. Pa., 1943).
70 Sec. 338(c), Nationality Act of 1940, 8 U.S.C.A. 738(c).
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mental reservation as to willingness to bear arms is fraud which will
71
warrant revocation proceedings.
Volumes may be written about the other misrepresentations. We
have gone into greater detail about lack of attachment and lack of
allegiance, because they are of timely interest. They are the grounds
upon which the recent "denaturalization trials" are based. They are,
true enough, part of a wartime program, but they are not born of war
hysteria, for the theory is an old one and denaturalizations on these
grounds were maintained even during peace time, as the perusal of
dates and decisions above will indicate.
The present "denaturalization program" found its inception in a
report on the German-American Bund written, in October 1941, by
members of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. This report
has been supplemented by voluminous investigations of the Federal
Bureau of Investigations, which now conducts all denaturalization investigations. Members of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
act as trial assistants to United States Attorneys and the entire program is supervised by the Criminal Division of the Department of
Justice.
In addition to fraud, illegality, as previously stated, is likewise
grounds for revocation proceedings. No alien has a fight to naturalization unless all statutory requirements are complied with and every
certificate of citizenship must be treated as granted upon condition
that the government may challenge it and demand its cancellation, unless issued in accordance with such requirements. If procured when
prescribed qualifications have no existence in fact, it is illegally procured.7 2 Illegality is present in all cases where naturalization was
fraudulently obtained, whereas in cases of illegal procurement, fraud
need not be necessarily present.
Judge Pierson M. Hall in a recent decision 73 devoted considerable
space to a breakdown of all cancellation cases prior to World War No.
2. In this breakdown he lists the grounds of cancellation either under
fraud or illegality or both. The breakdown, though very interesting, is
too lengthy to be reprinted here. In studying it, it becomes obvious that
the words fraud and illegality have not always been used with strict
accuracy by the courts.
It is now very important that an accurate determination be made
whether a revocation proceeding is decided on the ground of illegality
or fraud since it will make a difference under the Nationality Act 74
in its effect on derivatives.
United States v. Mickley, 44 F. Supp. 735 (E.D. Mich., 1942).
United States v. Ginsburg, 243 U.S. 472, 37 Sup. Ct. 422, 61 L.Ed. 853 (1917).
7 United States v. Reinhold Kusche, et al (D. C. S. Cal., July 1944).
71
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74 Sec. 338(d) Nationality Act of 1940, 8 U.S.C.A. 738(d).
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In view of the fact that a revocation of an order admitting a
person to citizenship amounts to a finding that the subject was never
a citizen 75 it carries in its wake a number of consequences both for
the person whose citizenship has been revoked and for those persons
who have derived certain rights through the alleged citizenship of the
subject. In addition to. the loss of citizenship, it may also effect the
legality of status of persons who gained entry as the wives or children
of the naturalized subject and may render them subject to deportation.
Prior to January 13, 1941, the effective date of the Nationality Act,
derivatives woud be deprived of their citizenship if the person through
whom they derived it lost his citizenship. Since the Nationality Act,
however, citizenship acquired through the naturalization of a husband
or parent is not lost except in a case of actual fraud.76 In all revocation cases the loss of citizenship dates from the date of its acquisition.
A special ground of revocation-and in addition to any other-is
the dishonorable discharge from military or naval forces of the United
States after March 27, 1942.77 The application of this act, however, is
limited to persons naturalized while serving in the military or naval
forces of the United States during the present war and under the
73
special provisions of the Second War Powers Act.
The problems of rules of evidence in revocation cases are no different from any other civil action in equity. The courts exercise a wide
discretion in the field of admissibility of evidence and the practical
application of the rules of evidence. The importance of citizenship has
been uniformly recognized. Consequently, in practice the courts have
required the government to meet an unusually high standard of proof
and conform with the strict application of the accepted rules of evidence. On the other hand, the courts as a matter of practice have
tended to be liberal with respect to defendants, allowing a wide latitude
both in substantive matter of defense and rules of evidence.
The character of the evidence varies in each case, depending upon
the ground upon which the action is instituted. It may range from documentary proof in cases of illegality to a general presentation of statements and conduct .of an individual over a period of many years in
cases based upon fraud or mental reservation. It is the latter category
which is currently of interest. The former cases present little trouble.
According to the latest decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
75 United States v. Rosenberg, 60 F. (2d) 475 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1932) cert. denied 287
U.S. 645, 53 Sup. Ct. 91, 17 L.Ed. 538 (1932).
76Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 32 Sup. Ct. 613, 56 L.Ed. 1066
(1911) ; United States v. Rosenberg, 60 F. 2d 475 (C.C.A. 3rd 1932) cert. de'
nied, 287 U.S. 645, 53 Sup. Ct. 91, 17 L.Ed. 538 (1932). Sec. 318(k) & 318.6,
Administrative Interpretations.
7 8U.S.C.A. 1004.
78 Ibid.
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United States v. Baumgartner, the courts have little discretion in such
79
cases.
In cases involving fraud, the state of mind of the defendant at the
time of naturalization is the all important issue for determination.
It may be proved by statements, acts and conduct concurrent with
naturalization, prior or subsequent thereto. The relevancy of the first
two categories is virtually self-evident. Concurrent evidence, is, of
course, the strongest, 0 and no less probative is evidence during the
probationary five year period, or whatever the probationary period
might be.81
The greatest controversy has raged, however, over the introduction
of evidence subsequent to naturalization. It has been uniformly held,
that such evidence is admissible. 2 Just what probative value it has is
another question. The precedents are in conflict just how soon after
naturalization such conduct must have taken place to raise the inference of fraud. Courts have cancelled citizenship on the basis of acts
occurring 30 years after naturalization8 3 while in others the courts have
held that acts occurring 8-10 years after naturalization are not sufficient
8 4
to establish fraud in naturalization.
With the recent Baum gartner case8 5 the Supreme Court has greatly
limited the probative value of evidence subsequent to naturalization
unless, of course, it be used in connection with other evidence either
during the probationary period or concurrent with naturalization.
The theory of admissibility of such evidence has been on the argument that loyalty to a new country is of slow growth and hence should
be stronger as time goes on.8 8 Where the existence of a condition
is shown, in the absence of a showing to the contrary, it is presumed to have existed for a reasonable time.'
It has also been held
that the attachment to the principles of the Constitution could not
have been very deep or sincere where it is easily supplanted within a
few years by an ideology, such as national socialism which is the complete antithesis of everything for which our Constitution stands. 88
79 Karl W. Baumgartner v. United States (Supreme Court June 12, 1944)..
80 United States v. Tapolscanyi, 40 F. (2d) 255 (C.C.A. 3rd 1930) ; United

States
v. Schneiderman. 320 U.S. 118, 63 Sup. Ct. 1333, 87 L.Ed. 1796 (1943).
81 United States v. Schneiderman, 320 U.S. 118, 63 Sup. Ct. 1333, 87 L.Ed. 1796
8 2 (1943).
Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 34 Sup. Ct. 10, 586 L.Ed. 101 (1913) ; United
States v. Krause, 136 F. (2d) 935 (C.C.A. 7th, 1943).
83 United States v. Wursterbarth, 249 Fed. 908 (D.C. N.J., 1918).
84 Rovin v. United States, 12 F. (2d) 942 (E.D. Mich., 1926) ; Rowan v. United
States, 18 F. (2d) 246 (C.C.A. 9th, 1926).
85 Karl W. Baumgartner v. United States (U. S. Supreme Court, June 12, 1944).
86 United States v. Herberger, 272 Fed. 298 (W.D.C. Wash., 1921) ; United States
v. Kuhn, 49 F. Supp. 407 (D.C. N.Y., 1943) ; United States v. Schuchhardt, 49
F. Supp. 567 (D.C. Ind. 1943).
87 United States v. Herberger, 272 Fed. 298 (W.D.C. Wash., 1921).
88 United States v. Krause, 136 F. (2d) 935 (C.C.A. 7th, 1943).
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In a number of cases the defendants have been asked whether their
attitude toward the principles of the Constitution or their loyalty to the
United States had changed at any time since naturalization. Such inquiries have usually been answered in the negative and courts have
found such statement probative to the effect that evidence of a particular attachment or a state of loyalty at any time subsequent to naturalization was the same as at the time of naturalization, since by the defendant's own admission it had remained unchanged.8 9
It would appear from reading the Baumgartnerdecision 90 as if this
"relation back theory" has been greatly emasculated. The language
both in that case and in the Schneiderman case 9 ' did not eliminate the
use of such evidence but it has greatly curtailed it.
Early cases have made a distinction whether disloyal statements
were made prior or subsequent to outbreak of war between subject's
country of origin and the United States. These are principally World
War I cases. 2 The situation now is different. The interests of Germany
for instance and the United States differed sharply even prior to the
outbreak of hostilities and in some instances it was quite impossible
to side with Germany without being disloyal to the United States. This
has been recognized judicially."
A considerable number of words have been spoken or written on
the question of "free speech." 94 Justice Rutledge's concurring opinion
in the Schneiderman case P5 seem to have given impetus to that argument. Yet, it would appear as if that issue were not involved. The
colloquy between Chief Justice Stone and Harold Evans of Philadelphia appointed defense counsel during the argument before the
Supreme Court in the Baumgartner case, perhaps best illustrates the
point. During the argument of counsel that admission of Baumgartner's
statements violated the constitutional guarantee of free speech, the
Chief Justice asked Mr. Evans whether he would contend that the use
of defendant's statement to the effect that he had procured naturalization fraudulently would be inadmissible under that theory. Mr. Evans
replied in the negative, whereupon the Chief Justice inquired what the
89

United States v. Wolter, 53 F. Supp. 400 (D.C. Pa., 1943).

90 United States v. Baumgartner, 47 F. Supp. 622 (W.D. Mo., 1942).

91 United States v. Schneiderman, 320 U.S. 118, 63 Sup. Ct. 1333, 87 L.Ed. 1796
92 (1943).
United States v. Woerndle, 288 Fed. 47 (C.C.A. 9th, 1923) ; Schurman v. United
States, 264 Fed. 917 (C.C.A. 9th, 1920).
93 United States v. Mickley, 44 F. Supp. 735 (D.C. Mich., 1942) ; United States v.
Ebell, 44 F. Supp. 43 (D.C. Tex., 1942) ; United States v. Schuchhardt, 49 F.
Supp. 567 (D.C. Ind., 1943); Contra: United States v. Rothermel (D.C. Mo.,
1942) ; United States v. Hartmann, 50 F. Supp. 394 (D.C. Pa.).
94 United States v. Schneiderman, 320 U.S. 118, 63 Sup. Ct. 1333, 87 L.Ed. 1796

(1943).

95 Ibid.
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difference was between such an unequivocal statement and other statements from which such an inference might fairly be drawn.
The question of free speech, however, is irrelevant in denaturalization cases. The defendant's right to say what he pleases is not being
contested. He is not being penalized for what he says. His own statements and acts are merely the best evidence of what is in his mind and
are most probative of the issues to be determined.
The interest which the "Denaturalization Program" has evoked has
given rise to statements that it was in the nature of a general purge.
According to the latest census there were 7,280,265 naturalized persons
in the United States as of 1940. Of those, 10,978 were investigated
under this program. The investigation proved groundless as to 9,815
of those cases. Of the remainder, 164 lost their citizenship through
court action. There are still 620 cases to reach court (and of those, very
few ever will, in the light of recent decisions) ; 169 are awaiting trial;
67 are under advisement in the district courts; 45 were decided in
favor of the defendants and 14 are on appeal. These figures are as of
June 15, 1944.
The program is and was principally one of security. Denaturalization renders the defendant an enemy alien and subject to internment.
The evidence in these cases was such that the defendants were thought
dangerous to internal security. In many cases, where the Department
of Justice did not consider the evidence sufficient to institute action, or
where decision was rendered adverse to the Government, the Army
had independently concluded the subjects unsafe to remain in vital
areas and had excluded them from the East Coast or West Coast
defense areas.
A survey of this subject discloses several interesting situations. It is
apparently very easy to become naturalized, whereas revocation is
extremely difficult. Paradoxically, it is very easy to denaturalize a person for the least significant reasons, such as illegality where the defendant may have been entirely innocent of any wrong doing, whereas it
is extraordinarily difficult to revoke a man's citizenship for far more
weighty reasons such as lack of attachment to the principles of the
Constitution or lack of allegiance to the United States.
Naturally it is regrettable that a person may be permitted to retain
citizenship where he is not entitled to it, because the Government is
unable to muster a sufficient quantum of evidence to prove a state of
mind at a given time. Remedial legislation in that respect has been
considered and rejected. This would appear for the best. It gives
emphasis to our democratic form of government. It is better that ten
wrongdoers retain their citizenship, than that one innocent person be
deprived of it.

